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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
Case No. 20030863-CA

v.
RON DENNIS SHEPHERD,
Defendant/Appellant

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a conviction on one count each of
burglary, a second degree felony, and theft, a class B
misdemeanor (R. 208-10).

This court has jurisdiction over the

appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e)(West 2004).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL AND
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
1.

Did the district court correctly conclude that the

eyewitness testimony of the burglary victim was constitutionally
reliable and, therefore, admissible at trial?
"In reviewing the trial court's decision to admit [evidence
of an eyewitness identification]," this Court "defer[s] to the
trial court's fact-finding role by viewing the facts in the light
most favorable to the trial court's decision

to admit and by reversing its factual findings only if they are
against the clear weight of the evidence."
P.2d 774, 782 (Utah 1991).

State v. Ramirez, 817

This Court reviews for correctness

the trial court's determination that "the[] facts are sufficient
to demonstrate reliability."
2.

Id.

Can defendant prevail on his claim of ineffective

assistance of counsel where he has not shown that his trial
counsel performed deficiently by not submitting to the court the
name, resume, and expected testimony of an expert on eyewitness
testimony or that he suffered demonstrable prejudice as a result?
In reviewing claims of ineffective assistance of counsel,
this Court must determine whether trial counsel's performance was
deficient and, if so, whether the deficient performance
prejudiced defendant.

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,

687 (1984); State v. Oliver, 820 P.2d 474, 478 (Utah App. 1991).
This claim presents a question of law, reviewed on the record of
the underlying trial.

See State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, If

16-17, 12 P.3d 92.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
No constitutional provisions, statutes, or rules are
dispositive.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with one count each of burglary and
possession or use of a controlled substance, both second degree
felonies; and one count each of theft and possession of drug
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paraphernalia, both class B misdemeanors (R. 5-6). Before trial,
he filed a motion to suppress eyewitness identification
testimony, which the trial court denied after a hearing (R. 5463; R. 131-36 at addendum A; R. 261) . A jury subsequently
convicted defendant of the burglary and theft charges (R. 19293).

The court sentenced him to a suspended term of one-to-

fifteen years in the Utah State Prison on the felony charge, and
180 days in jail on the misdemeanor, with credit for time served
(R. 208-10).

The court also ordered 100 hours of community

service, a fine, and 36 months on probation with certain
conditions imposed (Id.).

Defendant filed this timely appeal (R.

222) .
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Just after midnight on June 24, 2004, Mark Hartman, newly
arrived home from a business trip, picked up his two teenaged
children and drove to his home in Midway, which was in the
process of being remodeled (R. 256: 70-71).

As the family walked

onto the front porch and began inspecting the new exterior
construction, Hartman suddenly saw someone wearing shorts, a tshirt, and a backpack run out the back door (Id. at 73-75) .
Hartman chased the man until he lost him, and then returned home
(Id. at 75-76) .
Hartman and the children entered the home through the back
door (Id. at 7 6).

Hartman immediately noticed that the

refrigerator doors were open and a gallon of milk sat atop the
-3-

refrigerator (Id.).

Upstairs, he found part of his computer on

the hallway floor (Id.).

In Hartman's bedroom, dresser drawers

had been emptied, and all his clothing had been pulled from his
closet (Id. at 77). A half gallon of ice cream, with a spoon
stuck in it, rested on a chest of drawers (Icl) .
Hartman took the children outside and called 911 on his cell
phone (Id. at 78). As he finished the call, he saw a second man
exit the home (Id.).

This man wore shorts and a t-shirt and had

a towel draped over his head like a bonnet, concealing his face
(Id. at 7 9).

Hartman yelled at him, and the man yelled back,

making "a gesture with his arm as though he was carrying a
weapon" (Id. at 80). x Hartman immediately directed his children
to move slowly towards the car (Id.).
backed up, keeping his eyes on the man.

Hartman himself carefully
When he was out of

sight, Hartman dashed to the car (Id. at 81).
With his family safely in the car, Hartman was about to
drive off when he saw the same man, wearing a backpack, with the
towel still draped over his head, come around the house on a
bicycle and ride directly past him onto the street (Id. at 8182).

Hoping the police would arrive soon, Hartman decided to

follow him (Id. at 82, 84). As Hartman closed in on him, the man
"turned on his bike, and acted as though he was going to shoot at
my windshield" (Id. at 84). When the man made the same motion a

1

Because it was dark, Hartman could not tell what the man
was holding (R. 256: 80).
-4-

second time, Hartman "hit the back of the bicycle" with his car
(Id.).

The man fell off his bicycle, and the towel fell from his

head (Id. at 85). Defendant stood up and retrieved his bicycle
(Id. at 86). Hartman testified that he had a good view of
defendant:
I had the high beams on on [sic] my vehicle.
After I hit the individual, when he went to
stand up, I had a very, very good view of him
standing right in front of me, right in front
of my car. It was like as though he were a
deer in the headlights, and he was dazed
also.
Id.

Hartman testified that defendant was not pointing anything

at him during this time (Id. at 87). Hartman's attention was
focused, the man was not more than a few feet beyond the hood of
his car and, in addition to the car's high beams, a nearby street
light illuminated the scene (Id. at 87-88, 101-02) .
Defendant picked up his bicycle and then noticed that the
back tire was nonfunctional.

He dropped the bike and ran off

(Id. at 86). The police arrived shortly thereafter.

Despite a

search, they could not locate either man that night (Id. at 171).
Around 7:15 in the morning, a patrol officer located a
possible suspect walking down the roadway less than half a mile
from the burglarized home (Id. at 172). The suspect at first
denied any involvement in the burglary but then quickly confessed
and named defendant as his co-burglar (Id. at 111, 130, 136-37).

-5-

The suspect, Dustin Ward, testified at trial.2

He described

buying methamphetamine from defendant in Salt Lake, deciding with
defendant to go mountain biking around Midway, driving to The
Homestead parking lot in a truck belonging to a friend who was a
federal fugitive, and smoking methamphetamine along the way (Id.
at 118-21, 137). He further testified to seeing a house under
construction, riding over to it, climbing in a window, opening
the door for defendant, removing a Coke from the refrigerator,
and exploring the upstairs of the house (Id. at 122-25).
Ward confessed to taking a pair of binoculars and a knife
from the bedroom closet and said he saw defendant take a small TV
(Id. at 125-26).

He also saw defendant unhooking a computer

because "[h]e wanted the lower part of [it]" (Id. at 127). Ward
eventually went downstairs to retrieve his Coke.

He heard

voices, looked out the window, heard voices again, whistled a
warning to defendant, and then ran away (Id. at 128). Ward spent
the rest of the night in a nearby new home under construction.
He was apprehended about twenty minutes after leaving the home
the next morning (Id.).
Officer Winterton, the investigating officer, responded to
the scene of the burglary shortly after Mark Hartman called 911.
Winterton saw the damaged bicycle and found a backpack nearby.
In the backpack was a small TV, a key ring without any keys but
2

Ward was a convicted felon, serving a prison term at the
time he testified (R. 256: 108, 134-35). He was on probation at
the time of the burglary (Id. at 130).
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with the name "Ron" on it and, apart from the key ring, the keys
to the truck parked at The Homestead (Id. at 166-69).

Police

also found defendant's cell phone in the roadway near the bicycle
(Id. at 169-70).3
Just after 7:00 the next morning, Winterton witnessed the
arrest of Dustin Ward, whom he interviewed later that morning at
the sheriff's office (Id. at 171, 173). Winterton testified that
Ward's trial testimony was consistent with what Ward had told him
in the interview (Id. at 173).
Three days after the burglary, based on his interview with
Dustin Ward, Officer Winterton found a photograph of defendant
online, printed it, and telephoned Mark Hartman (Id. at 174).
Winterton "asked if [Hartman] could come to the sheriff's office
and look at some pictures, see if he could identify the
individual that he had seen, that he had stated he knocked off
his bicycle" (Id.).

At the sheriff's office, Hartman remembered

seeing "more than one photograph" (Id. at 105). He remembered
Winterton showing him two or three photos sequentially (Id. at
106).

Both Hartman and Winterton testified that the officer

showed Hartman one or two photographs and that Hartman did not
recognize the man on the bicycle in those photos.

(Id. at 105-

06, 175). Winterton then presented the photo of defendant, to

3

Defendant maintained that either Dustin Ward had stolen
the cell phone from him or that he "lost it" in his friend's
truck (Id^ at 170).
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which Hartman responded "immediately" and with 95% surety (Id. at
176).

Winterton testified that he did not compile a traditional

photo array in this case "[bjecause I had the co-defendant give
me the name of the suspect right out of the chute, within minutes
of him being detained.

I was asking Mr. Hartman to confirm what

I believe I already knew" (Id. at 178; accord R. 261: 6 ) .
Although defendant presented several alibi witnesses, all of
whom testified that he was at his mother's home enjoying a
barbecue when the burglary occurred and that he left only long
enough to purchase beer from a nearby grocery store, the jury
nonetheless convicted him of burglary and theft (Id. at 210, 218;
R. 257: 8-9, 11).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant contends that his conviction was primarily based
on an unreliable and inadmissible photo identification by the
victim.

Without this eyewitness identification to bolster the

testimony of co-burglar Dustin Ward, defendant asserts that the
jury would have been more likely to believe his alibi witnesses
and, consequently, to render a more favorable verdict.

When the

eyewitness identification is analyzed under the Ramirez factors,
however, one conclusion becomes inescapable.

Despite a less than

optimal photo identification procedure, the totality of the
factors bearing on reliability clearly demonstrate that the
identification was at least as reliable as the Ramirez
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identification.

Consequently, the trial court did not err in

admitting that evidence.
Defendant also contends that he received ineffective
assistance of counsel because his attorney failed to submit the
name, resume, and expected testimony of an eyewitness
identification expert.

This claim fails on both prongs of the

ineffectiveness analysis.

As to deficient performance, defense

counsel may have rationally decided it would be more tactically
advantageous to rely on the police officer's testimony that he
did not follow standard procedure in presenting the photos to the
witness and on the cautionary jury instruction than on a proffer
from an expert that counsel knew the court was likely to reject.
As to prejudice, defendant merely alleges it speculatively, with
no record support.

For these reasons, his ineffective assistance

claim fails.
ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY
DETERMINED THAT THE EYEWITNESS
TESTIMONY OF THE BURGLARY VICTIM
WAS CONSTITUTIONALLY RELIABLE AND,
THEREFORE, ADMISSIBLE AT TRIAL
Defendant argues that his conviction "was primarily based"
on unreliable and, hence, inadmissible eyewitness identification
testimony from the burglary victim (Br. of Aplt. at 18). Without
this "critical" testimony, he contends, the jury would have found
Dustin Ward's testimony less credible and his alibi witnesses
-9-

more credible, thus creating a "reasonable possibility" of a more
favorable outcome (Id. at 26).
The Utah Supreme Court has articulated the proper analytical
framework for determining whether, under the totality of the
circumstances, an eyewitness identification is constitutionally
reliable and, hence, admissible.
774, 781 (Utah 1991).

See State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d

The reliability analysis, rooted in due

process, addresses five "areas of concern":
1) the opportunity of the witness to view the
actor during the event;
2) the witness's degree of attention to the
actor at the time of the event;
3) the witness's capacity to observe the
event, including his or her physical and
mental acuity;
4) whether the witness's identification was
made spontaneously and remained consistent
thereafter, or whether it was the product of
suggestion; and
5) the nature of the event being observed and
the likelihood that the witness would
perceive, remember and relate it correctly.
State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483, 493 (Utah 1986).

"If the court

finds the identification reliable in light of these five factors,
then it is admissible under the Due Process Clause of the Utah
Constitution."
1997).

State v. Nelson, 950 P.2d 940, 943 (Utah App.

Moreover, if "the factors bearing on reliability clearly

indicate that the identifications . . . were at least as reliable
as the identifications in Ramirez," then this Court will
"conclude that admission of the eyewitness identifications . . .
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[does] not violate [defendant's] right to due process."

State v.

Hollen, 2002 UT 35, 1 64, 44 P.3d 794.4
Here, the trial court held a pre-trial hearing on the
constitutional reliability and admissibility of Mark Hartman's
eyewitness testimony (R. 261) . It entered extensive findings of
fact, which included findings addressing the five analytical
factors.

See R. 132-35 at addendum A.

The court concluded that

although "[t]he [photographic identification] procedure used was
not optimal," nonetheless, NNunder the totality of the
circumstances, the identifications are sufficiently reliable to
be admitted as evidence at trial" (R. 131 at addendum A).
trial court did not err.

The

The reliability factors in this case,

considered in their totality, demonstrate that Mark Hartman's
identification of defendant as the man who exited his home and
rode in front of him on a bicycle far exceeded the reliability of
the identification in Ramirez.
1.

Opportunity of witness to view the actor during the event.
The Ramirez Court articulated several circumstances that are

pertinent to this factor.

See Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 782.

4

Defendant also claims that admitting the eyewitness
testimony violated his federal constitutional rights. See Br. of
Aplt. at 26. While defendant inadequately briefs this issue, it
can nonetheless be disposed of easily. In Ramirez, the Utah
Supreme Court stated, "[W]e think that our article I, section 7
analysis is certainly as stringent as, if not more stringent
than, the federal analysis required by [Neil v. Biqqers, 409 U.S.
188 (1912)]."
817 P.2d at 784. As a result, even had defendant
briefed the issue, a separate federal analysis would not be
necessary.
-11-

a. Length of time and distance from which witness viewed the
actor.
In Ramirez, the witness testified that he viewed the actor
for "a ^few seconds' or ^a second' to ^a minute' or longer."
P. 2d at 782.

817

Although the eyewitness stated that he viewed the

actor from a distance of about ten feet, another witness
indicated the distance may have been as much as thirty feet.

Id.

In this case, the trial court specifically found that "Mr.
Hartman was able to watch the suspect for several seconds as the
suspect stood directly in front of the headlights, apparently
trying to figure out what to do.

During this process, the

suspect also looked directly at Mr. Hartman for a few seconds"
(R. 134 at addendum A ) .

Hartman testified that he was driving

the car, and the suspect was directly in front of the car, a
distance of approximately 6-7 feet (R. 256: 88).

These

circumstances are at least as favorable as those in Ramirez.
b.

Capability to view the actor's face.

In Ramirez, a scarf "cover[ed] most of [the actor's] face."
817 P.2d at 776.

The eyewitness could only observe the actor's

eyes and note that they were small.

Id. at 782.

Here, defendant

held a towel around his head until Hartman hit his bicycle.

Then

the towel fell off, and defendant's face was fully visible (R.
256: 85-86).

This factor is also more favorable than in Ramirez.

-12-

c.

Lighting.

In Ramirez, the eyewitness observations occurred at
nighttime in a parking lot.

817 P.2d at 776.

Witnesses

described the lighting variously as "good" and as "poor" and
stated that "the gunman was in a shadowy area."

Id. at 783.

In

this case, the trial court found that the victim's high beams
were shining directly on defendant, giving the victim a clear
view of defendant's illuminated face (R. 134 at addendum A; R.
256: 86). In addition, a street light was shining directly over
the point of impact (Id. at 87, 101). This factor is
significantly more favorable than Ramirez.
d.

Distractions.

Defendant contends that "there can be no question that" the
victim was distracted by the presence of his teenaged children on
the floor in the backseat of the car and by defendant pointing an
unknown object at him (Br. of Aplt. at 23). The record provides
no evidentiary support for defendant's speculation about the
children.

As for the possibility of a gun, Hartman testified

that although he was "scared," he was also very "focused" (R.
256: 89). In any event, the possibility of a gun created a less
significant distraction than the unequivocal presence of a real
gun wielded by a second robber in Ramirez.

817 P.2d at 776; see

also Hollen, 2002 UT 35, SI 35 (presence of second perpetrator
increases distraction level of eyewitness).

-13-

2.

Degree of attention.
Hartman had an unobstructed view of defendant after

defendant fell from his bicycle in front of Hartman's car (Id. at
85-87).

At that juncture, Hartman's attention was not diverted

by the threat of any weapon.5

Indeed, Hartman characterized

defendant's demeanor like "a deer in the headlights" (Id. at 86).
The trial court found that at this point defendant "was nonthreatening and apparently dazed" (R. 134 at addendum A ) .
Any diversion posed by the earlier threat of a weapon or by
the presence of Hartman's children crouched quietly in the
backseat of the car "pales in comparison to the diversion created
by the accomplice in Ramirez, who was swinging a pipe at the
witness and threatening him during the witness's observations of
the defendant."

Hollen, 2002 UT 35, 1 38 (citing Ramirez, 817

P.2d at 783).
3.

Capacity to observe.
"Here, relevant circumstances include whether the witness's

capacity to observe was impaired by stress or fright at the time
of the observation, by personal motivations, biases, or
prejudices, by uncorrected visual defects, or by fatigue, injury,
drugs, or alcohol."

Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 783.

5

Earlier in the encounter, defendant had made gestures
with his hand suggesting he might have a gun (Id. at 80, 96,84,
102). Hartman conceded that at these times, he was afraid he was
going to get shot (Id. at 81).
-14-

The trial judge found that "[t]here is no evidence that Mr.
Hartman was impaired by any visual defects, fatigue, drugs, or
alcohol" (R. 132-33).

This comports with Hartman's testimony

that his vision was good, that he was not tired because he had
slept on the plane ride home, and that he had not consumed any
drugs or alcohol that day (R. 256: 89). He conceded that while
the situation scared him, it also increased his focus on the
perpetrator (Id. at 87).
The circumstances in Ramirez presented far greater concerns
that fear, stress, or injury affected the witness's capacity to
observe.

There, one robber struck the eyewitness with a pipe and

told a second assailant, in the eyewitness's presence, to shoot
and kill him if he caused any further problems.

817 P.2d at 776,

783.
4.
Spontaneity, consistency, and suggestibility of the
identification.
Multiple circumstances are relevant to this factor.

See

Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 783.
a.

Length of time between observations and identification.

Here, Hartman observed defendant just after midnight on June
24th and identified his photo on the morning of June 26th (R. 256:
165, 174; R. 261: 4 ) .

In Ramirez, the witness identified the

actor at a show up "thirty minutes to an hour after the crime."
817 P.2d at 783.

Relying on Ramirez, however, Hollen later held

that a photo array identification made two months after a robbery

-15-

and a lineup identification made more than a year after the
robbery were both constitutionally reliable.

See Hollen, 2002 UT

35, 1 46.
b. Mental capacity and state of mind at the time of
identification.
Hartman identified defendant in the quiet of the sheriff's
office two days after the burglary (R. 133 at addendum A ) .

The

record evidence nowhere suggests that Hartman experienced any
difficulty that might have impaired his ability to identify
defendant or that he was under any unusual stress or agitation at
the time.

In contrast, the witness in Ramirez identified the

actor within an hour of the robbery when, as the court opined, he
might still be somewhat agitated, given the violent circumstances
of the robbery.

Nonetheless, the court found that "his state of

mind did not otherwise influence his identification."

Hollen,

2002 UT 35, 148 (citing Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 783).
c. Exposure to opinions, descriptions, identifications, or
other information.
At the time of the Ramirez identification, "the witness knew
. . . that police believed that the defendant matched the
description of the suspect, and that another victim had not
identified the suspect as one of the assailants."

Id. at 5 53

(citing Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 783). Here, Hartman knew less:
simply that the officer wanted to show him some photographs.

The

trial court found that "Sergeant Winterton did not make any
comments to Mr. Hartman indicating any belief that the photograph
-16-

portrayed the same suspect seen by Mr. Hartman" (R. 132 at
addendum A; R. 261: 11).
d. Instances when witness or other eyewitness failed to
identify defendant.
In Ramirez, only one of three eyewitnesses was able to
identify the defendant.

817 P.2d at 783.

Here, Hartman, the

only eyewitness, identified defendant when he first saw his
picture and remained consistent in his identification thereafter.
R. 256: 90-92.

The trial court found that "Mr. Hartman has not

wavered in identifying Defendant as the suspect" (R. 132 at
addendum A ) .
e.

Consistency of witness descriptions.

Hartman provided the police with only a minimal description
of the burglar (R. 261: 17-18).

His description, however, is

irrelevant to the identification because the officer's undisputed
testimony was that he showed Hartman the photograph based not
Hartman's description but on the name Dustin Ward provided (R.
261: 5, 20).
f. Suggestibility of circumstances under which defendant
was presented to the witness for identification.
Here, Officer Winterton showed defendant 2-3 photos, one at
a time (R. 256: 105-06, 175). Because the officer did not
compile a traditional photo array, the court found that the
identification procedure was "essentially a photographic
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x

show-

up'" (R. 133 at addendum A). 6

The court concluded that although

"[t]he procedure used was not optimal," that factor alone was
insufficient to render the identification constitutionally
unreliable.

R. 131 at addendum A.

In comparison, the supreme court in Ramirez highlighted the
"blatant suggestiveness" of the showup in that case, describing
it as "troublesome," and yet still concluding that the evidence
was admissible.

Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 784.

The identification

occurred "on the street in the middle of the night. Ramirez,
with dark complexion and long hair, was the only person at the
showup who was not a police officer."

Id.

He "stood with his

hands cuffed to a chain link fence behind his back.

The

headlights of several police cars were trained on him."

Id.

Despite these highly suggestive circumstances, the supreme court
held that the identification was constitutionally reliable.
5.

Nature of the event.
Under this factor, a court should consider "^whether the

event was an ordinary one in the mind of the observer during the
time it was observed, and whether the race of the actor was the
same as the observer's.'"

Id. at 781 (quoting Long, 721 P.2d at

6

At the suppression hearing, the court characterized the
procedure as "a show up without the real person" (R. 261: 27).
For purposes of determining the threshold legal question of
reliability, however, this characterization is not dispositive.
All eyewitness identifications are measured against the same
factors regardless of the particular police protocol employed.
See, e.g., State v. Hollen, 2002 UT 35, 44 P.3d 794 (lineup);
State v. Hubbard, 2002 UT 45, 48 P.3d 953 (photo array); State v.
Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774 (1991) (showup) .
-18-

493).

In Ramirez, the witnesses' attention was focused by their

awareness of a robbery in progress.
had been burglarized.
same.

Here, Hartman knew his home

These circumstances are essentially the

In Ramirez, however, the witnesses and the actor were of

different races, while here, the trial court found that Hartman
and defendant were of the same race (R. 133 at addendum A ) .
In sum, after comparing the facts of this case to those in
Ramirez, the trial court correctly concluded: "The [photo
identification] procedure was not optimal.

Nonetheless, under

the totality of the circumstances, the identifications are
sufficiently reliable to be admitted as evidence at trial" (R.
131 at addendum A).

Accordingly, defendant's claim fails.

See

Hollen, 2002 UT 35, 1 64 ("the factors bearing on reliability
clearly indicate that the identification[] in this case [was] at
least as reliable as the identification in Ramirez. Accordingly,
. . . admission of the eyewitness identification into evidence
did not violate [defendant]'s right to due process under Article
I, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution."
POINT TWO
DEFENDANT'S INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE
OF COUNSEL CLAIM FAILS WHERE HE HAS
DEMONSTRATED NEITHER DEFICIENT
PERFORMANCE BY HIS TRIAL COUNSEL
NOR PREJUDICE RESULTING FROM THAT
PERFORMANCE
Defendant argues that his trial counsel rendered ineffective
assistance by failing to provide the court with the name, resume,
and expected testimony of an eyewitness identification expert
-19-

whom defense counsel wanted to call as a witness.
Aplt. at 27.

See Br. of

He asserts that he was harmed by his counsel's

omission because, given the strength of Mark Hartman's eyewitness
testimony, "[t]he eyewitness expert very likely may have made a
difference with an explanation of the fallibility associated with
eyewitness testimony" (Br. of Aplt. at 28).
To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim,
defendant must demonstrate that his counsel's performance was so
deficient as to fall below an objective standard of
reasonableness and that, but for the deficient performance, a
reasonable probability existed that the outcome of the trial
would have been different.

Strickland v. Washington, 4 66 U.S.

668, 694 (1984); State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 186-87 (Utah
1990).

Defendant's claim fails on both prongs of the

ineffectiveness test.
When assessing deficient performance, "a[n appellate] court
must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls
within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance."
State v. Taylor, 947 P.2d 681, 685 (Utah 1997)(quoting
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). "If a rational basis for counsel's
performance can be articulated [this Court] will assume counsel
acted competently."
App. 1993).

State v. Tennyson, 850 P.2d 461, 468 (Utah

"[A]n ineffective assistance claim succeeds only

when no conceivable legitimate tactic or strategy can be surmised
from counsel's actions." Id.
-20-

In this case, defense counsel argued at the suppression
hearing that he should be permitted to have an expert witness
testify about "what's wrong with what [the police] did" in
conducting the identification procedure (R. 261: 30). In
response, the court noted that Officer Winterton planned to admit
that he did not "follow correct police procedure with respect to
identification" and that, in addition, the jury would receive a
cautionary jury instruction warning that the reliability of
eyewitness identification is "not that good" (Id. at 30; R. 33,
34; see also R. 238-41 at addendum B ) .
When defense counsel continued to advocate for an expert,
the court responded, "And I know, I assume I know who you would
call.

I've heard his testimony probably three or four times.

And I, I don't really think his testimony is helpful to the jury"
(Id. at 33).

Defense counsel pressed on, leading the court to

finally end the discussion by stating, "What I'm going to do . .
. on that particular issue is[,] I want you to designate who you
. . . anticipate you would call.
CV and . . .

I want you to include . . . the

a report as to what he would testify to" (Id. at

35) .
Trial counsel did not pursue this invitation, inaction that
defendant construes as deficient performance.

Defense counsel,

however, might well have chosen not to pursue the expert witness
for tactical reasons.

The court's remarks indicated it was not

particularly receptive to the utility of expert testimony in this
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area.

Indeed, it had suggested that expert testimony would only

be duplicative of both the officer's own admission that he had
not followed police protocol and of the lengthy, cautionary,
eyewitness identification jury instruction.

See R. 261: 33.

Under such circumstances, defense counsel might well have thought
it better trial strategy to rely on the cautionary instruction,
the officer's testimony, and his own closing argument rather than
bring before the court a proffer from an expert that the court
was disinclined to accept and which was well within its
discretion to reject.

See State v. Butterfield, 2001 UT 59, 543,

27 P.3d 1133 (trial court does not abuse its discretion when it
refuses to admit expert testimony that would be "in the nature of
a lecture to the jury as to how they should judge the facts");
State v. Hubbard, 2002 UT 45, 516, 48 P.3d 953 ("[A] trial
court's refusal to admit evidence [does] not constitute an abuse
of discretion when proffered expert testimony would amount to a
lecture to the jury as to how they should weigh testimonial
evidence").

Where, as here, a rational basis for defense

counsel's tactical choice can be articulated, defendant's claim
of deficient performance fails.

See Tennyson, 850 P.2d at 468.

Defendant has also failed to demonstrate any prejudice
flowing from his counsel's alleged error in not submitting the
credentials and proposed testimony of his expert witness. "To
show prejudice under the second component of the
[ineffectiveness] test, a defendant must proffer sufficient
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evidence to support ^a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding
would have been different.'"

Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516,

522 (Utah 1994) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694).
Defendant's claim fails from the outset because he has not
proffered any record evidence that would undermine confidence in
the jury's verdict.

Because neither the record nor his appellate

brief details the substance of the proposed expert testimony,
this Court has no basis upon which to judge whether that
testimony would have amounted to anything more than a generalized
lecture to the jury about how to judge the credibility of the
eyewitness.

Where defendant has wholly failed to demonstrate

that the expert's testimony would have been admitted and, had it
been admitted, that it would likely have made a difference to the
outcome of the case, his claim of prejudice fails.

"On many

occasions, this court has reiterated that proof of ineffective
assistance of counsel cannot be a speculative matter but must be
a demonstrable reality."

Fernandez v. Cook, 870 P.2d 870, 877

(Utah 1993)(footnote omitted).

Without demonstrable proof of the

substance of the expert's testimony, defendant's allegation of
prejudice stands as an unadorned and speculative claim.
Arquelles, 921 P.2d 439, 441 (Utah 1996).
fails.
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State v,

Consequently, it

CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, this Court should affirm defendant's
convictions for one count each of burglary, a second degree
felony, and theft, a class B misdemeanor.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this /f day of November, 2004.
MARK L. SHURTLEFF
Attorney General
/MMAAJL-C
JOANNE C. SLOTNIK
Assistant Attorney General
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR WASATCH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO SUPPRESS
EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. 021500129
Judge Donald J. Eyre

RON DENNIS SHEPHERD,
Defendant.

THE ABOVE-ENTITLED MATTER came before the Court on Defendant's motion to
suppress the out-of-court and in-court identifications of the eyewitness, Mark Hartman.
Defendant was present and represented by counsel, J. Bruce Savage. The State was represented
by Thomas Low. Evidence was taken and arguments were heard. The Court now being fully
advised in the premises, makes and enters the following Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law,
and Order.

1

FINDINGS OF FACT
On June 24, 2002, Mark Hartman arrived at his home in Midway, Utah, with his
two children, and discovered a man coming out of his house, who thereafter fled.
Mr. Hartman then left his children outside, entered his home, looked around, and
came back outside after confirming that his home had been burglarized.
While Mr. Hartman was outside, a second intruder exited the home wearing a
towel over his head to obscure his face. Mr. Hartman could not see the man's
face through the towel.
The second intruder (hereinafter "the suspect") pointed something at Mr.
Hartman, which Mr. Hartman thought might be a gun, though it was too dark to
be sure. Mr. Hartman told his children to get back in the car, and Mr. Hartman
backed up, still facing the suspect until he turned a corner and then quickly got
into his car.
Mr. Hartman observed the suspect leaving his home on a bicycle. Mr. Hartman
followed the suspect in his car, with his high-beams illuminating the suspect. The
suspect, certainly in an attempt to dissuade Mr. Hartman from following him
further, pointed something backwards toward Mr. Hartman's car. In response to
this perceived threat, Mr. Hartman caused his vehicle to bump the suspect's
bicycle, causing the suspect to fall from the bicycle and the towel he had

2

continued to wear to fall from his head.
6.

After the suspect fell from the bicycle, he got up and tried to get back on the
bicycle. Mr. Hartman, whose headlights were still set on high-beam, looked at
and clearly saw the suspect's face. The suspect apparently discovered that his
bicycle's rear wheel had been bent rendering the bicycle inoperable. Mr. Hartman
was able to watch the suspect for several seconds as the suspect stood directly in
front of the headlights, apparently trying to figure out what to do. During this
process, the suspect also looked directly at Mr. Hartman for a few seconds. The
suspect then fled on foot.

7.

The following facts are pertinent in applying Ramirez's analysis to those moments
after the suspect's towel fell from his head and stood in front of Mr. Hartman's
vehicle:
a.

Opportunity: Mr. Hartman had a clear, unobstructed view of the suspect's
face, his headlights providing direct illumination.

b.

Attention: Mr. Hartman was aware that his home had just been
burglarized. The other burglar had fled previously and was no longer a
distraction to Mr. Hartman. The suspect, having been violently knocked
off his bicycle, was non-threatening and apparently dazed.

c.

Capacity: There is no evidence that Mr. Hartman was impaired by any
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visual defects, fatigue, drugs, or alcohol.
d.

Nature of the Event: Mr. Hartman was aware of the burglary of his home;
and the suspect was a Caucasian, same as Mr. Hartman.

8.

On June 26, 2002, Sergeant Jeff Winterton called Mr. Hartman and asked him to
come to the Sheriffs Department to view a picture—essentially a photographic
"show-up." Sergeant Winterton had obtained a picture of Defendant because the
co-defendant in this case, Dustin Ward, had confessed to his own involvement in
the burglary and had also implicated Defendant.

9.

When Mr. Hartman arrived at the Sheriffs Department, Sergeant Winterton
showed him the picture of Defendant and asked him if that was the person that he
had knocked off the bicycle two days previous. Mr. Hartman immediately
responded that it was the same person, and clarified that he was ninety-five
percent sure.

10.

Subsequent to this photographic identification, Mr. Hartman had no other
exposures to Defendant, whether in person or by photograph, until the Preliminary
Hearing held nearly five months later, on November 13, 2002. At that time he
again identified Defendant as the suspect he had knocked off a bicycle.

11.

Concerning the method of identification employed by Sergeant Winterton, the
following facts are relevant to the "Spontaneity and Consistency (Suggestibility)"

4

prong of the Ramirez analysis:
a.

The photographic identification occurred within two days of the burglary.

b.

Only a single photograph was used.

c.

The photograph was not an attempt to match a description provided by Mr.
Hartman.

d.

Sergeant Winterton did not make any comments to Mr. Hartman
indicating any belief that the photograph portrayed the same suspect seen
by Mr. Hartman.

e.

Mr. Hartman's identification of Defendant as the suspect was immediate.

f.

Mr. Hartman has not wavered in identifying Defendant as the suspect.

BASED ON the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now makes and enters the
following Conclusions of Law:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The Court must make a preliminary finding of threshold reliability before
permitting the out-of-court and in-court identifications by Mr. Hartman to be
admitted to a jury. It is the State's burden of proof. The standards for these
threshold findings are set forth in State v. Ramirez. 817 P.2d 774 (Utah 1991),
and its progeny.

5

2.

In examining the facts of the present case in light of those of Ramirez, the Court
concludes that the comparison is favorable.

3.

The procedure used was not optimal. Nevertheless, under the totality of the
circumstances, the identifications are sufficiently reliable to be admitted as
evidence at trial.

BASED ON the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Court now
makes and enters the following Order.
ORDER
1.

Defendant's motion to suppress the out-of-court and in-court identifications by
Mr. Hartman is denied.

2.

As to Defendant's request for an expert witness, he is instructed to provide the
Court, within ten days, the expert's curriculum vitae and report setting forth his
expected testimony, whereupon the Court will rule on the request.

DATED t h i s ^ day of May, 20Qi.
•^A**'**

<&P&—

wwa^

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

J. BRUCE SAVAGE, Attorney for Defendant

RULE 4-508 NOTICE
You are hereby notified that the above Findings, Conclusions, and Order will be
submitted to the Court eight days from the date that it was mailed to you unless you notify
counsel for the State that you object to its form.

THOMAS L. LOW

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
r

>^
day of _
I hereby certify that on this
, 2003,
I caused to be mailed, by first class mail postage prepaid a true^d correct copy of the foregoing
to:

J. BRUCE SAVAGE
1790 BONANZA B 223
P.O. BOX 2520
PARK CITY, UTAH 84060

CKAT.^J/JMC
Legal Secreta
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Addendum B
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1

INSTRUCTION NO.

is

One of the most important issues in this case is the identification of the defendant as the
person who committed the crime. The prosecution has the burden of proving beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant was the person who committed the crime. If, after
considering the evidence you have heard from both sides, you are not convinced beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant is the person who committed the crime, you must find the
defendant not guilty.
The identification testimony that you have heard was an expression of belief or
impression by the witness. To find the defendant not guilty, you need not believe that the
identification witness was insincere, but merely that the witness was mistaken in his belief or
impression.
Many factors affect the accuracy of identification. In considering whether the
prosecution has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is the person who
committed the crime, you should consider the following:
(1)

Did the witness have an adequate opportunity to observe the criminal actor? In
answering this question, you should consider:
(a)

the length of time the witness observed the actor,

(b)

the distance between the witness and the actor,

(c)

the extent to which the actor's features were visible and undisguised,

(d)

the light or lack of light at the place and time of observation,

(e)

the presence or absence of distracting noises or activity during the
observation, and

(f)

any other circumstances affecting the witness's opportunity to observe the
person committing the crime.

(2)

Did the witness have the capacity to observe the person committing the crime? In
answering this question, you should consider whether the witness's capacity was
impaired by:

(3)

(a)

stress or fright at the time of observation,

(b)

personal motivations, biases, or prejudices,

(c)

uncorrected visual defects,

(d)

fatigue or injury,

(e)

drugs or alcohol, or

(f)

by being a person of a different race from the criminal actor.

Was the witness sufficiently attentive to the criminal actor at the time of the
crime? In answering this question, you should consider whether the witness knew
that a crime was taking place during the time he observed the actor. Even if the
witness had adequate opportunity and capacity to observe the criminal actor, he
may not have done so unless he was aware that a crime was being committed.

(4)

Was the witness's identification of the defendant completely the product of his
own memory? In answering this question, you should consider:

(a)

the length of time that passed between the witness's original observation
and his identification of the defendant,

(b)

the witness's mental capacity and state of mind at the time of the
identification,

(c)

the witness's exposure to opinions, to descriptions or identifications given
by other witnesses, to photographs or newspaper accounts, or to any other
information or influence that may have affected the independence of his
identification,

(d)

any instances when the witness failed to identify the defendant,

(e)

any instances when the witness gave a description of the actor that is
inconsistent with the defendant,

(f)

the circumstances under which the defendant was presented to the witness
for identification. You may take into account that an identification made
by picking the defendant from a group of similar individuals is generally
more reliable than an identification made from the defendant being
presented alone to the witness. You may also take into account that
identifications made from seeing the person are generally more reliable
than identifications made from a photograph.

If, after considering the evidence you have heard from the prosecution and the defendant,
and after evaluating the eyewitness testimony in light of the considerations listed above, you

have a reasonable doubt about whether the defendant is the person who committed the crime, you
must find him not guilty. If, on the other hand, you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that
the defendant is the person who committed the crime, you must find him guilty.

